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Abstract
We attempt to clarify the main conceptual issues in approaches to ‘objec-
tification’ or ‘measurement’ in quantum mechanics which are based on super-
selection rules. Such approaches venture to derive the emergence of classical
‘reality’ relative to a class of observers; those believing that the classical world
exists intrinsically and absolutely are advised against reading this paper.
The prototype approach (Hepp) where superselection sectors are assumed
in the state space of the apparatus is shown to be untenable. Instead, one
should couple system and apparatus to an environment, and postulate supers-
election rules for the latter. These are motivated by the locality of any observer
or other (actual or virtual) monitoring system. In this way ‘environmental’
solutions to the measurement problem (Zeh, Zurek) become consistent and
acceptable, too. Points of contact with the modal interpretation are briefly
discussed.
We propose a minimal value attribution to observables in theories with
superselection rules, in which only central observables have properties. In
particular, the eigenvector-eigenvalue link is dropped. This is mainly moti-
vated by Ockham’s razor.
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1 Introduction
The original title of this paper was “To observe is to not observe”, but it was pointed
out to the author that this represented a contradiction. Our first aim is to discuss
certain lines of criticism that have been, or could be, leveled against resolutions
of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics which essentially rely on the
(algebraic) theory of superselection rules. Secondly, we will indicate how this theory
may be combined with more recent ideas on decoherence and apparatus-environment
coupling in order to counter the more pertinent critique. Thus we will arrive at the
following point of view: the essence of a ‘measurement’, ‘fact’, or ‘event’ in quantum
mechanics lies in the non-observation, or irrelevance, of a certain part of the system
in question. The latter may well be the universe as a whole; one is not forced to make
a ‘Heisenberg cut’ between system and observer, and in our analysis the observer
(or IGUS = Information Gathering and Utilizing System in modern parlance (Gell-
Mann and Hartle, 1990, 1993); whenever we speak of an observer in what follows,
the reader may add ‘or IGUS’) relative to which the notion of non-observation or
irrelevance is defined may be regarded as part of the system, and may be described
by quantum mechanics if necessary. Without such irrelevance of some part of the
system the notion of a fact (etc.) is meaningless in quantum mechanics, or, put
differently, there can only be events once a specific algebra of ‘observables’ has been
singled out. Any event that ‘happens’ only comes into existence relative to such
a choice of ‘observables’, and on the assumption of the ignorance interpretation of
mixed states. A world without parts declared or forced to be irrelevant is a world
without facts - such a world may be preferable to ours. As we shall see, in practice
facts owe their existence to the locality of the observer (a point of view the author
learned from H.D. Zeh).
The measurement problem (cf. Busch et al. (1991), van Fraassen (1991) for an
extensive discussion) is a special case of the enigma of classical behaviour within
quantum mechanics. The precise formulation of the problem depends on the for-
malism one uses, and on the interpretative rules connecting the formalism to the
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world. The fine kettle of fish is most evident if in the usual (von Neumann) liturgy
one assumes a one-to-one correspondence between the physical properties of a sys-
tem (in the sense of value attributions to observables) and its states. For in that
case the formalism predicts the existence of states which seem to never occur. Such
states are superpositions of eigenstates of operators which are ‘classical’ in the sense
that the corresponding observables are empirically found to always possess sharp
values.
The aim of this Introduction is to specify where the theory of superselection
rules (on our reading) stands within the debate on the foundations of quantum
mechanics, and to introduce the essential points of this theory with its physical
interpretation. In section 2 we study a model, and we identify its main diseases in
section 3. The best cure is investigated in section 4 in the form of the introduction
of the environment into the problem. Section 5 then discusses points of contact with
the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. The final section contains some
self-criticism, as well as a summary of our approach in the form of a question- and
answer session.
In order to explain what we accept as chivalrous criticism of superselection ap-
proaches to the measurement problem, and which type of argument we reject as
mock critique, we recall that in the context of quantum mechanics there exist two
radically different views on the nature of ‘classical’ reality (for a good discussion
cf. D’Espagnat (1990), Tsirelson (1994)). The difference between the two has been
expressed in Khalfin and Tsirelson (1992, p. 904) by saying that “the ‘optimists’
investigate the emergence of classical reality relative to a class of observers, whereas
the ‘pessimists’ acknowledge only absolute (independent) classical reality”. To elab-
orate on this point, we distinguish between two further positions, which have both
been advocated as ‘realism’.
The first position, which we call A-realism, maintains that there exists a real
world independently of the observer, and that one can make objective, observer-
independent statements about it. This creed is meant to be contrasted with idealism,
solipsism, and the like. It is very broad, and further subdivisions arise once an A-
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realist specifies how (s)he relates the alleged real world to our observations, and
what the aim of science should be. Thus almost opposite extremes such as naive
realism and constructive empiricism (which is presented as an anti-realist pursuasion
in van Fraassen (1980)) both fall under A-realism.
This position has been attacked by some of the pioneers of quantum mechanics,
and has been claimed to be inconsistent with it; the existence of the modal inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics (van Fraassen, 1991, Kochen, 1985, Healey, 1989,
Dieks, 1994a,b) shows that this latter claim is false. We see nothing objectionable
to A-realism, and will adopt it in this paper.
The second position, B-realism, is in fact a specialization of A-realism, but in
a good many papers on the foundations of quantum mechanics it is confused with
(usually unqualified) ‘realism’ itself. It claims that this postulated real and indepen-
dently existing world coincides with, or at least incorporates the classical world of
‘events’ and ‘facts’ that we observe around us. One may compare this with the pre-
Copernican world view: the earth appears to be at rest, the sun revolving around
it, and since it looks so to us, it must be real and true, independently of us. Some
Anglo-Saxon more sympathetic to B-realism might instead describe it as the ap-
plication of G.E. Moore’s common-sense realism to the interpretation of quantum
mechanics. However, once it is realized that we should try to understand why we
see things as we do, rather than explaining why these things (supposedly) ‘are’ the
way we see them, one cannot help feeling awkward with B-realism.
Whether or not an author advocating superselection- or decoherence-type so-
lutions to the measurement problem is an A-realist, (s)he will definitely reject B-
realism at least when analyzing such solutions, for it is the whole point of these
approaches to show that under certain conditions the classical world emerges rel-
ative to, say, local observables. Hence (s)he is an example of an optimist in the
sense of the above quote. From the point of view of a B-realist, such solutions are at
best valid ‘For All Practical Purposes (FAPP)’, and thus a large body of criticism on
superselection- or decoherence-approaches can be summarized simply by saying that
these approaches do not conform to B-realism. We believe that this type of critique
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is based on a hallucination, for it is blind to the fact that the notion of classical
reality itself is only valid FAPP (and not quantum mechanics, or resolutions of the
measurement problem based on it).
In further motivating the point of view opposite to B-realism, we start by in-
troducing some terminology. Quantum mechanics may be fruitfully thought of as
having a kernel as well as a user interface. The kernel relates to observer-independent
aspects of the real world. It primarily consists of the mathematical formalism, in-
volving either operators, states, and transformations like time-evolution, or path
integrals and an action functional, or some other mathematical machinery. Thus at
the level of the kernel one may speak of eigenvectors, eigenvalues, and of mathemat-
ical expressions that are usually interpreted as expectation values of observables or
transition probabilities. This particular physical interpretation is very delicate; it
evidently does not belong to the mathematical formalism, but in our opinion it is
not even part of the kernel at all (see below). In particular, it would be a mistake to
assume the so-called ‘eigenvector-eigenvalue link’ (stating that an observable pos-
sesses a value if the state vector of the system is an eigenstate of the corresponding
operator) as part of the kernel, and neither do the Born probabilities make physical
sense at this stage.
Secondarily, an A-realist will want to relate the mathematical formalism to the
observer-independent world through interpretative rules which are part of the kernel.
Such a relation is not indispensable in order to confront the theory with observations,
for one could introduce the physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism at
the level of the observer. Indeed, the latter procedure is followed in the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics, and also in our exegesis of the theory of su-
perselection rules given later on. But one would clearly feel more comfortable if the
empirical content of the theory would follow from a direct physical interpretation
in the kernel, amended by an objective description of the observer. In our opinion,
this ideal situation has not (yet) been achieved in quantum mechanics (the modal
interpretation being an attempt in that direction, cf. section 5 below).
The user interface specifies the connection between the real world and the ob-
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server, regarded as part of the world. Hence (s)he/it is subject to the same laws
(such as quantum mechanics) that govern the world. This interface is an objective
account of those ingredients of the world which emerge only relative to the specifi-
cation of an observer (or class of observers). Tautologically, observations in general
are one example of such an ingredient. More daringly, we maintain that the entire
classical world is another case in point.
The interpretation of mathematical expectation values in terms of measurements
(particularly the eigenvector-eigenvalue rule), cross-sections, as well as more recent
notions such as the probabilities of histories (Omne`s, 1992, Gell-Mann and Hartle,
1990, 1993), properly belong to the user interface. Evidently, this interface cannot
be created without a specification of the user. This is an elementary though crucial
point: if we wish to explain from quantum mechanics why the world appears to us
as it does, i.e., largely classically, we should expect this explanation to come from
the user interface, and therefore be contingent on what or who the user is. (The
question why the world is largely classical seems to us to be as little motivated as
the question why the present King of France is bald.)
A somewhat related point was made by Zurek (1993, pp. 287-8): “Thus, the only
sensible subject of considerations aimed at the interpretation of quantum theory -
that is, at establishing correspondence between the quantum formalism and the
events perceived by us - is the relation between the universal state vector and the
states of memory (records) of somewhat special systems - such as observers - which
are, of necessity, perceiving the Universe from within. It is the inability to appreciate
the consequences of this rather simple but fundamental observation that has led to
such desperate measures as the search for an alternative to quantum physics.”1
Moreover, the necessity of identifying the user interface of a theory as the source of
concepts naively thought to belong to the kernel even applies to classical physics,
for instance in the problem of the emergence of time in the context of generally
covariant field theories (cf. Barbour, 1994).
The theory of superselection rules is an important tool in attempts to make these
1We do not agree that such a search is a desperate move; the point is that it is misguided when
motivated by the measurement problem.
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ideas precise. In its modern algebraic version, this theory was created by Haag and
Kastler (1964), and the first application to the measurement problem was performed
by Hepp (1972), who acknowledges that the main ideas are due to Fierz and Jost;
also cf. Bohm (1951), Gottfried (1966), Jauch (1968) for pioneering insights in this
direction; later work is e.g. Wan (1980), Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981). A recent
review, emphasizing technical points and explaining relevant aspects of the mathe-
matical apparatus of operator algebras, is Landsman (1991) (to which the present
paper is complementary). In what follows, we assume that the reader is somewhat
familiar with the basic ideas of this approach, but we will keep technicalities to a
minimum. Even if this familiarity is marginal or rusty, it will be easy to understand
the key ideas on the basis of the example discussed in the next section. The in-
terpretation of the formalism we offer is quite different from the one found in the
literature (where one is usually satisfied with straightforward operationalistic ideas).
A different motivation from the one given here to justify superselection rules is in
Breuer et al. (1994).
In fact, the main idea is very simple. In conventional quantum mechanics any
self-adjoint operator on a given Hilbert space H is deemed an observable, and there-
fore any unit vector in H corresponds to a pure state. However, a realistic observer
will not actually monitor all conceivable correlations in the universe. Hence this
setting may be modified by leaving out a certain set of operators from the ‘algebra
of beables’ B(H) (i.e., the algebra of all bounded operators on H), to arrive at a
remaining ‘algebra of observables’ A (which we assume to be a von Neumann al-
gebra2 for mathematical convenience). In our interpretation, the truncation of the
original set B(H) of beables to a (much) smaller set of observables A is made by the
‘user’, who normally has little choice in doing so. This truncation therefore belongs
to the user interface of quantum mechanics. We then regard a unit vector Ψ in H
as a state3 ψ on A. Thus Ψ determines a rule ψ telling each operator A in A what
2This means that A consists of bounded operators, contains the unit operator, and is closed in
the weak operator topology. Hence it is closed in the uniform operator topology as well, so that
each von Neumann algebra is a C∗-algebra if it is equipped with the latter topology.
3This is a linear functional on A which is positive (i.e., ψ(A∗A) ≥ 0) and normalized (ψ(I) = 1,
where I is the unit operator in A).
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its expectation value ψ(A) is, namely (AΨ,Ψ). But now such a state may well be
mixed4 on A!
Therefore, we have to investigate the possible decompositions of Ψ (or ψ). We
make the simplifying assumption that the commutant5 A′ of A on H is abelian
(that is, commutative). This assumption6 amounts to the statement that A is
represented without multiplicities, i.e., redundant repetitions of information7. We
say that Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈ H lie in different superselection sectors (or, briefly, sectors) if
(AΨ1,Ψ2) = 0 for all A ∈ A
8.
In general, a mixed state ψ on A may not have a unique extremal decomposi-
tion9 ψ =
∑
i piψi into pure states ψi (with the coefficients pi adding up to one)
10.
However, we are in the special situation that the state ψ on A is the restriction
to A ⊂ B(H) of a state defined by a vector Ψ in H. In that case we can write
Ψ =
∑
i ciΨi, with all the Ψi lying in different sectors, and this decomposition is
unique. Moreover, our assumption that A′ be abelian implies that each Ψi corre-
sponds to a pure state ψi on A. Hence with pi = |ci|
2 we obtain the unique extremal
decomposition ψ =
∑
i piψi. As will become clear shortly, these coefficients pi are
the Born probabilities. The uniqueness of the central decomposition is crucial for
this interpretation.
Indeed, at this point the formalism ought to be connected to observation. The
simplest way to do so is to only assign properties to classical observables. Here a
self-adjoint operator in A is called a classical observable if it belongs to the cen-
tre Z(A) of the algebra of observables A - this means that it commutes with all
4A state ψ is mixed if it may be decomposed as ψ = λψ1 + (1 − λ)ψ2 with 0 < λ < 1 and
ψ1 6= ψ2.
5This is the set of all bounded operators on H which commute with all elements of A.
6Which implies that A must be a type I von Neumann algebra.
7See footnote 12 for the general case.
8Together with our assumption, this implies that the corresponding states ψ1, ψ2 define inequiv-
alent representations of A.
9An extremal decomposition of a mixed state is by definition a decomposition into pure states.
See Bratteli and Robinson (1987) for an exhaustive mathematical account of the decomposition
theory of states on C∗-algebras, and cf. sect. 4.5 of Landsman (1991) for the general conditions
under which the extremal decomposition is unique.
10For simplicity we suppress the possibility of a direct integral decomposition of the state; the
argument is analogous in that case.
8
other elements of A. Equivalently, eigenstates with different eigenvalues cannot be
coherently superposed. Only classical observables possess values, and all classical
observables simultaneously assume (sharp) values. In a pure state ψ, the value of
A ∈ Z(A) is simply ψ(A). To deal with mixed states (crucial in the measurement
problem) we adopt the ignorance interpretation of mixed states which have a unique
extremal decomposition; as shown above, if the total universe is in a pure state this
uniqueness assumption can be justified11. Thus in a state ψ =
∑
i piψi the classical
observable A has value ψi(A) with probability pi.
We have dropped the eigenvector-eigenvalue link for general operators: for us, an
eigenvector Ψa of a given operator A ∈ A corresponds to a possessed (eigen) value
a of A if and only if A is classical. Similarly, the Born probability |(Ψ,Ψa)|
2 only
has the usual meaning if A is classical. In this circumstance, each eigenvalue will
be highly if not infinitely degenerate; the probability that the observable A has the
value a in the state Ψ is the sum over all pertinent Born probabilities. Our main
reason for dropping the eigenvector-eigenvalue link is Ockham’s razor: as is well
known (van Fraassen, 1991, Healey, 1989) this link is empirically superfluous, and
in our opinion it results from misguided attempts to assign properties to observables
in a specific way, thus introducing the Born probabilities at the level of the kernel of
quantum mechanics. Further arguments in favour of our minimal value attribution
will be presented in the course of this paper12.
11If the universe is in a mixed state (whatever that may mean) we still recover the Born proba-
bilities, as shown in footnote 12 below.
12The first such argument comes from states on A which do not admit a unique extremal
decomposition. This may happen if the state on B(H) (whose restriction to A is ψ) is itself mixed;
alternatively, even a pure state onB(H) may restrict to such a state onA if we drop the assumption
that the commutant A′ on H is abelian. (Lifting this assumption is necessary to describe certain
states of infinite systems, whose algebras of observables always admit representations which are
not of type I.)
Any state ψ has a unique central decomposition ψ =
∑
i
piωi into ‘macroscopically pure’ states.
A macroscopically pure state ω on A, also called a primary or a factorial state, may be defined
by the property that any discrete decomposition ω =
∑
n
λnωn consists of states ωn which all
lie in the same sector, up to multiplicity (that is, the GNS representations of A defined by these
states are all unitarily equivalent up to multiplicity). If A is of type I then ω has discrete extremal
decompositions. (If A is not of type I the extremal decompositions of ω are of direct integral
type, and the component states will not lie in the same sector. Such extremal decompositions are
useless.)
The main point is now that the states occurring in any further decomposition of a given macro-
scopically pure component of the central decomposition of ψ all coincide on the centre Z(A) of
9
The statistical character of quantum mechanics entirely derives from the co-
efficients pi in the unique decomposition of mixed states into pure ones, if this
uniqueness applies. Thus it fully sits inside the user interface. We find this most
satisfactory, for it shows that probability only emerges if some part of the system is
left out of consideration, and therefore has a similar origin as in classical physics: it
reflects ignorance of the discarded part. The kernel of quantum mechanics remains
fully deterministic.
Carefully note, that this does not lead to a conventional hidden variables inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics, for the part of the world that is declared irrelevant
is a quantum system. Also, the elimination of the irrelevant observables should not
be confused with incorrect attempts to resolve the measurement problem by finding
the apparatus in a mixed state (namely a reduced density matrix) obtained by trac-
ing out either the measured system or the environment; such mixed states do not
have a unique extremal decomposition, and even if their orthogonal decomposition
is unique, they do not admit a consistent ignorance interpretation (on the latter
point see e.g. Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981), van Fraassen (1991), Busch et al.
(1991)).
If this approach can be made to work, it obviates the need for a ‘collapse of the
wavefunction’ as a consequence of the act of perception. Recall that in his attempt to
resolve the measurement problem von Neumann (1932) introduced an irreversible
time-evolution in quantum mechanics, on top of the reversible unitary evolution
given by the Schro¨dinger equation. This was motivated by his idea that these two
evolutions would correspond to the system evolving either while being perceived,
or autonomously, respectively. In contrast, in approaches based on superselection
rules there is a single time-evolution, and the duality solecistically identified by
A. In other words, for the classical observables there is no distinction between the central and
the extremal decomposition. In view of our value attribution rule, the coefficients of the central
decomposition may therefore still be interpreted as Born probabilities. The ignorance interpreta-
tion of mixed states is now only applied to the central decomposition. Conversely, the uniqeness
of the central decomposition as opposed to the nonuniqeness of the extremal decomposition may
be used as an argument in favour of our point of view that only classical observables possess val-
ues. For states ψ of the special type considered in the main text, the extremal and the central
decompositions coincide.
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von Neumann actually corresponds to the system being purely quantal, or (partly)
classical, depending on its algebra of observables. The ‘collapse’ does enter through
the back door, but plays a different, mind-independent role: as we shall see, it sneaks
in through the definition of the time-evolution of the algebra of observables of the
environment. We stress that this has nothing to do with acts of measurement of
observation.
The main program in this approach is evidently to firstly describe and justify the
truncations allowing the ensuing algebra of observables to have a nontrivial centre,
and secondly to derive the appropriate mixed ‘post-measurement state’ ψ having
the desired unique extremal decomposition. This leads to considerable difficulties,
to which we shall turn first.
2 A simple model
The following model of a measurement apparatus was considered by Hepp (also cf.
Bona (1980), Bub (1988)). It seems that most points of philosophical interest can
be discussed in its context. The apparatus consists of an infinite chain of spin 1/2
particles. The Hilbert space of states H (which is non-separable) is the so-called
complete13 infinite tensor product of all single-particle Hilbert spaces C2. The set
of all beables would correspond to the algebra B(H) of all bounded self-adjoint
linear operators on H. The dynamics of the system is given by a nearest-neighbour
coupling of ferromagnetic type. Hence the ground state is doubly degenerate: either
all spins are up, or they are all down. Equivalently, one may regard this apparatus
as a photo-emulsion (which is what Hepp did). In this interpretation the ‘spin up’
state of each spin 1/2 particle is replaced by an AgBr molecule (assumed to have
just one state of interest), while the ‘spin down’ state corresponds to an Ag atom.
The crucial assumption is now that pointer observables are generated by local
operators of the type A1 ⊗ A2 ⊗ . . . An . . . I . . . I . . ., in which only a finite number
of entries Ai (which are 2x2 matrices) are different from the unit matrix I. This as-
13This means that there are no restrictions on the infinite tail. An example of an incomplete
infinite tensor product would be the Hilbert space completion of the set of those states in which
only a finite numbers of spin are up. See von Neumann (1938).
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sumption says that the algebra A of pointer observables is insensitive to correlations
at infinity14.
On this assumption, H splits up into disjoint superselection sectors. For example,
the ground states ↑ . . . ↑ in which all spins are up, and ↓ . . . ↓ in which they are
all down, have the property (A ↑ . . . ↑, ↓ . . . ↓) = 0 for all A in A. Any two such
vectors in H between which all matrix elements of A vanish, are accordingly said
to lie in different superselection sectors. Conversely, two vectors which differ only
in a finite number of single-spin states are clearly in the same sector. If we form a
sum Ψ = aΨ1 + bΨ2 of two vectors lying in different sectors, then the corresponding
state ψ on A equals |a|2ψ1 + |b|
2ψ2, that is, it is mixed.
Now consider the operator sn = I ⊗ . . . σ3 ⊗ I . . ., which has σ3 = diag(1,−1)
in the n-th entry, and unit matrices everywhere else. From the sn we build S =
limN→∞ 1/N
∑
N
n=1 sn. (This limit exists in the weak operator topology and lies in
A.) The operator S has the remarkable property that its matrix elements between
any two vectors in a given sector coincide, so that it only ‘sees’ in which sector a
given vector lies. For example, (SΨ,Φ) = 1 for any two vectors Ψ,Φ which lie in
the same sector as ↑ . . . ↑, and (SΨ,Φ) = −1 in the sector of ↓ . . . ↓. Indeed, the
operator S is a classical observable, as defined in the Introduction.
To apply this setting to the measurement problem, consider a single spin 1/2
particle, whose spin is measured by the pointer. Assuming that the initial state of
the pointer is ↑ . . . ↑, this implies that the post-measurement state of the pointer
should be in the sector of ↑ . . . ↑ in case the particle spin is up, whereas it should be
in the sector of ↓ . . . ↓ in the opposite case. If so, we can simply look at the operator
S to see what the spin of the particle was. If the particle is in a superposition
a ↑ +b ↓ of up and down states, the pointer will not be in the corresponding
superposition of ↑ . . . ↑ and ↓ . . . ↓: instead, its state ψ will be mixed on A,
and the unique decomposition into pure states is (with some abuse of notation)
ψ = |a|2 ↑ . . . ↑ +|b|2 ↓ . . . ↓.
14A is given by the weak closure of the linear span of all operators of the given type. In this
example, the commutant A′ is not abelian, cf. footnote 12. We therefore have to check explicitly
whether a given vector Ψ ∈ H defines a state on A whose extremal decompoition is unique.
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Hence, as promised, the Born probabilities normally associated with the particle
whose spin is being measured, emerge as coefficients in the decomposition of the
mixed post-measurement state of the apparatus. Moreover, the usual measurement
‘paradox’ of arriving at never-observed superpositions of pointer states has been
obviated15. If the post-measurement emergence of the pointer in a definite state, in
which S has either the value 1 or -1, is taken to be an event, then the occurrence
of such an event is definitely predicted, although which of the two possibilities is
realized is a probabilistic affair, as usual. This statement relies on the ignorance
interpretation of mixed states allowing a unique extremal decomposition.
But how is the desired post-measurement state to be arrived at? The problem is
that the initial pointer state ↑ . . . ↑ should stay in the same sector if coupled to the
state ↑ of the particle, whereas it should evolve into the ↓ . . . ↓ sector if coupled to
the ↓ state. Hepp showed, in models as well as in a theorem, that this cannot be done
in finite time with an automorphic evolution16. Heuristically, what has to happen
is that the particle in the spin down state should flip the first spin in the pointer,
then the second. . . , so that it is obvious that one needs an infinitely long time to
complete the measurement. In other words, the dilemma is this: superselection
sectors are defined by the property that no observable (such as the Hamiltonian)
can interpolate between them. Yet the little spin which is measured is supposed to
cause precisely such a transition.
The best one can achieve is that
lim
t→∞
(A(t) ↑ . . . ↑ ⊗ ↓, ↑ . . . ↑ ⊗ ↓) = (A(0) ↓ . . . ↓ ⊗ ↓, ↓ . . . ↓ ⊗ ↓)
for each fixed A ∈ A; here A(t) is the Heisenberg picture time evolution of the oper-
ator A. This led to (a revival of) the idea, that one ought to regard a measurement
15Cf. Dieks (1991) and Landsman (1991) for two explanations why this ‘paradox’ is spurious
anyway.
16This is the algebraic counterpart of a unitary evolution in the usual formalism. Also cf.
Landsman (1991) for a further discussion. The claim in Bub (1988) that this can be accomplished
nonetheless is too hasty. It is trivial to find a unitary group Ut which maps any sector in any other
one in a finite time; the point is that in addition a corresponding Heisenberg picture time-evolution
of the algebra of observables should be defined. This is not done in Bub (1988); in particular, for
his Ut the map A(t) = UtAU
∗
t
maps A outside the algebra of observables A. To get back into A,
one would need a conditional expectation from B(H) to A, as in section 4 below. In the present
case (and similar ones) such an object is not readily available.
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as a process analogous to a scattering event, which officially takes infinite time to be
completed, too (in the sense that the particles only approach their on-shell states in
the t→∞ limit), with no one ever complaining about the idealization this implies.
3 The disaster of infinite measurement time
Unfortunately, one cannot help feeling uncomfortable with this approach to the
measurement problem. States in different superselection sectors may be thought
of as being ‘macroscopically’ different: they differ by an infinite number of single
spin states in the pointer. If one only monitors a finite number of spins, one cannot
detect in which sector the pointer state lies. We are supposed to see instantly what
the (final) macroscopic state of the pointer is, for otherwise we would not accept
it as a measurement device. However, at any finite time this macroscopic state
coincides with the initial state (up to a finite number of spins). (Note, that our
alleged ability to see an infinite number of spins as such does not conflict with the
assumption that the pointer observables are (quasi-) local. This ability means, that
we can monitor observables like S. A nonlocal observable, however, would detect the
quantum interference between states in different sectors, that is, such an observable
would correlate an infinite number of spins. And to see such correlations is surely
beyond us).
The achievement of a limit means, that for finite but very large time the quantity
that is to have the given limit (namely the matrix element of a fixed local observable
A), differs from its limit value by an arbitrarily small number. Since in any finite
time only a finite number of spins in the pointer have flipped, that is, the pointer is
still in its original sector ↑ . . . ↑, we can only have the illusion that the measurement
has almost been completed because the fixed operator A above monitors a finite
number of spins (or, as in the case of the pointer observable S, is a weak limit of
such operators). But it is precisely the infinite ‘tail’ of the pointer which determines
in which sector it is, and which ‘macroscopic’ properties it has. If we really ‘observe’
the entire pointer, we would at any finite time conclude that the pointer is still in the
↑ . . . ↑ sector, and abandon the hope that any form of measurement of the particle
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spin is being performed.
A somewhat confusing variant of this argument was forwarded in Bell (1975),
where the poverty of the way the infinite-time limit of the measurement is ap-
proached is illustrated by the following observation. Suppose we give the opera-
tor A an explicit time-dependence At, which exactly cancels its Heisenberg-picture
time-dependence A(t). Then (At(t) ↑ . . . ↑ ⊗ ↓, ↑ . . . ↑ ⊗ ↓) is obviously time-
independent, and no limit will ever be reached! Of course, we previously assumed A
to be fixed, and by replacing it with At one inserts an infinite family of operators.
To interpret this argument properly, it should be realized that it can be forwarded
against the idea of measurement altogether, in that the explicit time-evolution At
simply ‘undoes’ the measurement. Thus we briefly discuss this possibility.
The ‘undoing’ of quantum measurements was discussed by Peres (1980, 1986),
who claimed its impossibility. The argument is that the construction of the ex-
plicit time-dependence At amounts to an inversion of the equations of motion; this
would imply that given the pointer state at time t, Bell (1975) would have to cal-
culate its state at t = 0. For the Heisenberg picture matrix element (At(t)Ψ1,Ψ2)
equals the Schro¨dinger picture (AtΨ1(t),Ψ2(t)), which indeed by construction equals
(AΨ1(0),Ψ2(0)). If the pointer is sufficiently large (it is, indeed, assumed to be infi-
nite), that would certainly have been beyond Bell’s abilities, were it not for the fact
that the initial pointer state is known to be ↑ . . . ↑!
Thus Peres’ counterargument seems to lose its weight. On the other hand, one
might argue that the initial pointer state does not need to be exactly ↑ . . . ↑;
it suffices for it to be in the same superselection sector. But to use the type of
complexity argument in Peres (1980), a sufficiently large number of pointer spins
should be randomly determined in the initial state. But how large is ‘sufficiently
large’, compared to the infinite number of spins that are fixed to be up in this
sector? Fortunately, irreversibility arguments attempting to make the undoing of
the measurement impossible by declaring the initial state to be randomish are very
powerful indeed, but need a little extra ingredient, as we shall see in the next section.
A further point is that one should acknowledge that all pointers are actually
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composed of a finite number of particles17; the infinite system is the ‘exact back-
ground theory’ that B-realists always call for. But to what extent does the theory of
a finite pointer approximate this exact theory? One usually hears that on account
of the Stone-von Neumann uniqueness theorem, superselection rules do not exist in
finite systems. Hence one would have to go for approximate superselection rules,
in the sense that one tries to find classes of states with the property that matrix
elements of ‘relevant’ observables between any two vectors lying in a different class
are ‘small’, cf. Lloyd (1988). The idea here is that only a relatively small number
of spins determine the relevant algebra of observables, the much larger remainder
playing the role of the infinite tail of the exact theory.
This is problematic; for one thing, the ignorance interpretation of mixed states
only works if some unique decomposition is applied (such as the central decompo-
sition, cf. footnote 12). But if the superselection rules are only approximate, the
centre is trivial and one does not even have suitable ingredients for a decomposition
of an exact mixture, let alone of an approximate one. And what is small and what
is large? The relevant scale should be set externally. It all starts to sound pretty
vague. (This dilemma has led Bub (1988) to propose that one needs truly infinite
apparatuses to resolve the problem; hence only infinite systems can have ‘objective’
properties. While we are sympathetic to the idea of an approximate reality in fi-
nite systems, the problem of the infinite-time limit is not resolved in this way (cf.
footnote 16 on Bub (1988)). Moreover, the origin of the objectification of properties
of infinite systems still lies in the choice of local observables; this idea, however, is
much more convincingly implemented if one invokes the environment (see below).)
Apart from this conflict between macroscopic observability and locality of the
interaction with the measured system, one may argue that resolutions of the mea-
surement problem involving superselection rules of the apparatus are incomplete
17The fact that the stuff of the world is quantum fields rather than particles does not affect this
discussion, despite the fact that a field theory has an infinite number of degrees of freedom even in a
localized region. For the local algebras in quantum field theory are factorial von Neumann algebras
of type I (in the non-relativistic case) or type III (in the relativistic case), and these admit only
one (normal) representation up to unitary equivalence. Hence they cannot lead to superselection
rules.
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even if they work, for the ‘algebra of observables’ is not an intrinsic object: by
name alone, it presupposes a theory of the observer and his/her/its coupling to the
apparatus. Hence in any case the choice of the observables, and thereby the supers-
election rules, must be motivated externally. So far, their introduction has (at best)
merely parametrized the classical behaviour.
4 Environmental superselection rules
Let us return to a finite (but large) pointer, into whose state space we still would
like to introduce superselection sectors in some sense. A crucial assumption in
the Stone-von Neumann uniqueness theorem, which is usually quoted as excluding
superselection rules in finite systems, is that one has a simple algebra18. Indeed,
a finite system does have superselection rules if its algebra of observables is not
simple, cf. Landsman (1991). To illustrate this point, consider the algebra M2 of
2× 2 matrices, acting on the Hilbert space C2. Let the basis vector e1 stand for a
photon19 state localized very far away from the photon state e2. Saying that M2 is
the algebra of observables of this system amounts to pretending that an operation
exists by which one can determine quantum interference between these basis states.
This not being feasible20, one will have to admit that the actual ‘effective’ algebra
of observables, relevant to a local observer who/which is unable to perform highly
nonlocal measurements, is D2 ≃ C⊕C, the algebra of diagonal 2×2 matrices. This
surely has two inequivalent representations21, and hence two superselection sectors.
The first sector has e1 as its only normalized vector (up to a phase), and the second
sector contains merely e2. This is possible, as D2 is not simple; instead, it is the
18A simple C∗-algebra is one without closed 2-sided ideals. Since the kernel of any representation
forms an ideal, it follows that all representations of simple algebras are faithful.
19Any light particle would do. We ignore helicity, anyway.
20 The claim in Aharonov et al. (1986) that nonlocal states can sometimes be measured is of no
relevance here. To determine quantum interference between localized states x and y one needs an
operator A such that (Ax,y) 6= 0. But the observables considered in Aharonov et al. (1986) are
of the form A1 + A2, where the localization region Ø1 of A1 contains x but not y, and vice versa
for A2. Such operators have vanishing matrix elements between x and y. Moreover, they are not
nonlocal at all in the usual sense (Haag, 1992): they are localized in Ø1 ∪Ø2.
21The first one maps the first copy of C to itself, and the second copy to zero; the second one
does the opposite.
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direct sum of 2 copies of the algebra of the complex numbers.
Our finite pointer can inherit these superselection rules in the following way. If
the pointer contains N spins, its algebra of observables is M2N . The algebra of the
total system pointer + photon is then Atot = M2N ⊗ D2, and has 2 sectors. In a
first attempt to exploit this, one would like to find an initial photon state IE and a
pointer-photon interaction such that, any pointer state U in which an overwhelming
majority of the spins is up, coupled to (i.e., tensored with) IE evolves into U ⊗ e1,
whereas the analogous states D ⊗ IE with most spins down evolve into D ⊗ e2.
These two final states are in different superselection sectors, and the same effect has
been achieved as in the infinite pointer. The role of the infinite tail of the latter
is now played by the photon, which flies away to the Andromeda nebula. (As in
the preceding section, this transition cannot be achieved with an automorphic time
evolution; see below for the resolution.)
If we now re-introduce the particle whose spin is measured, we see that once again
a superposition a ↑ +b ↓ of states of this particle does not lead to a corresponding
superposition of the pointer + photon, but to a mixture whose decomposition into
pure states has the Born numbers |a|2 and |b|2 as coefficients. The origin of this
‘collapse of the wavepacket’ now lies in the relative delocalization of the photon
states e1 and e2, combined with the presumed locality of the observer, rather than
in the locality of the pointer observables (see below for a more detailed explanation
of this point). Also, since the pointer is finite, one only needs a finite time for all
the spins in it to flip if necessary, and the photon flies away rather quickly, too.
Unitarity of the time evolution implies that the initial photon state has to be
fixed in order to achieve this scenario. This is undesirable, firstly because photons
are not part of the construction of pointers (they belong to the ‘environment’),
and secondly because the invariability of the initial state leads to the possibility of
‘undoing’ the measurement, as explained earlier. The way out is to consider a very
large environment E (perhaps consisting of an enormous number of photons). Its
algebra of observables AE is still supposed to lead to superselection rules on its state
space, by not containing operators whose measurement would involve the detection
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of quantum interference between states which are localized lightseconds or more
away from each other. The mechanism by which the omission of such operators
from the original simple algebra leads to the ensuing algebra being non-simple, is
exactly the same as in the example above.
The general strategy to obtain superselection rules (caused by the locality of the
observer) is to identify subsystems between which no correlations are observed. For
example, one may imagine a sphere with radius R around the observer, and stipulate
that no correlations with any region outside this sphere are observed22. The precise
value of R is rather arbitrary, as long as it is very large23 compared to the size of the
system studied. A measurement is then completed the moment the objects (e.g.,
photons) carrying the quantum correlations of the system after the interaction with
the environement have left the sphere.
The only requirement on the dynamics is that U ⊗ IE and D ⊗ IE evolve into
U ′ ⊗ en and D
′ ⊗ em, respectively, where the final environment states en and em
(which may vary with the initial environment state IE) lie in different superselection
sectors, and U ′ and D′ are ‘close’ to U and D (in a sense to be made more precise
shortly). If the interaction between pointer and photon bath is suitable (see below),
this condition will be satisifed by the overwhelming majority of initial states, for
the environment has a large number of particles, each of which interacts with the
pointer, and it suffices if merely one of these particles has an initial state leading to
orthogonal final states after coupling with the pointer states U and D, respectively.
Even if that is not the case, the phases of the terms in the inner product (en, em)
(which is a sum of products of a gigantic number of single-particle inner products)
will be random so that the product vanishes (a point forcefully made by van Kampen
(1988), who added that someone who does not accept this doesn’t understand what
physics is). Any reasonable assumption on what the algebra of observables of the
22This differs from the approach of Wan and Jackson (1984). Their condition for an operator
A on L2(R3) to be an observable is that (AΨ,Ψ) = 0 for all Ψ localized outside the sphere.
Our condition is that (AΨ,Φ) = 0 for all Ψ localized outside the sphere and Ψ,Φ having disjoint
(essential) support.
23 Sending R to infinity is not the same as having no dismissed correlations at all; it rather
corresponds to ignoring correlations at infinity. The superselection rules of local field theories are
a consequence of this.
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environment relative to a local observer is will then imply that en and em are not
merely orthogonal but lie in different sectors on top of that.
The technical conditions under which the above scenario works were established
by Zurek (1981, 1982, 1993) (also cf. Joos and Zeh (1985) and Zeh (1970)), where the
idea of introducing the environment in the measurement problem was first proposed).
In these papers, the central issue is to identify the family of pointer states {pn}n
which has the property we ascribed to U and D, that is, that for most environment
states IE , pn⊗IE evolves into pn⊗en for some environmental state en, with en and em
orthogonal for n 6= m. This is so if the operator P which has the pn as eigenstates
commutes with the interaction Hamiltonian describing the coupling between the
pointer and the environment.
As a first application of this rule, we can easily see why the presumed locality of
an observer excludes the possibility of measuring correlations between two photon
states which are delocalized relative to each other. For let e1 and e2 have their
previous meaning. To detect interference between these states, one would need to
bring eigenstates of the Pauli matrices σ1 or σ2 into correlation with the eigenstates
of a certain operator relevant to the observer; the former eigenstates here play the
role of the pn. But a local observer-photon interaction Hamiltonian must have the
form HI = [e1]Φ1+[e2]Φ2, where [ei] is the projector on ei, and the Φi are operators
on the state space of the observer. Now clearly the commutators [HI , σ1] and [HI , σ2]
are nonzero, so it follows that the establishment of the desired nonlocal correlation
must involve a nonlocal interaction Hamiltonian (an obvious result!).
If the pointer is large, one can relax the stability condition on pn under time-
evolution, so that one is in an even more comfortable position than Zurek’s. For
in that case the only requirement is that pn ⊗ IE evolves into p
′
n
⊗ en, where p
′
n
is macroscopically close to pn (and (en, em) ≃ δnm, as before). To illustrate what
this means, consider the case where the pointer observable P is taken to be S =
1/N
∑
N
n=1 sn, defined as in the previous section, but not taking the limit N → ∞.
The eigenstates of S are states of the form ⊗N
n=1 un, where each un is an eigenstate
of σ3. The spectrum of S is {(2N+ − N)/N |N+ = 0, . . . , N}; here N+ is simply
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the number of un’s whose spin is up. This spectrum is highly degenerate, and,
more importantly, for large N the eigenvalues are closely packed. To read off the
measurement outcome it is sufficient that the expectation value of S in the final
state is either close to 1, or to -1. So in the above argument, pn and p
′
n
should have
almost the same expectation value of S. This modified requirement makes Zurek’s
stability condition far more robust, and easier to satisfy.
The transition pn ⊗ IE → pn ⊗ en is evidently a time-dependent process, so let
us write en(t) to make this clear. It turns out that (en(t), em(t)) ≃ δnm only for
t→∞ and an infinite environment. For finite environments the inner product typi-
cally becomes exponentially and phenomenally small quickly, gets ever smaller, until
it returns to sizable values after supercosmic timescales (Poincare´ recurrence), cf.
Zurek (1981, 1982, 1993), Joos and Zeh (1985), and refs. therein. The consequences
of this behaviour may be illustrated on our familiar one-photon example. So let the
post-measurement state vector be aU ⊗ (e1 + ǫ(t)e2)+ bD⊗ (e2 + ǫ(t)e1); we ignore
terms of order ǫ2, so that this state is normalized. Under the same assumptions as
before, this state is mixed, and the corresponding density matrix has the unique
extremal decomposition ρ(t) = |a|2[v1] + |b|
2[v2], where [vi] denotes the projector
on vi, v1 = |a|
−1(aU + ǫ(t)bD) ⊗ e1 and v2 = |b|
−1(bD + ǫ(t)aU) ⊗ e2. Since the
decomposition is unique, we are still entitled to apply the ignorance interpretation
of such mixed states, which implies that the coupled system is either in the state v1
(with probability |a|2), or in the state v2 (with probability |b|
2). Here ǫ(t) is very
small, and gets increasingly smaller, as indicated above.
We see that no difficulty arises. All macroscopic observables (like S) will equate
v1 with U⊗e1 and v2 withD⊗e2 (up to terms of order ǫ
2). To distinguish between v1
and U⊗e1, one would have to perform interference experiments involving all spins in
the chain, and even so one would detect an effect of order ǫ(t), which, as mentioned
before, is astoundingly small. In case one is actually able to do all this, it has to
be concluded that the pointer has failed its service as a measurement apparatus: if
an undesired superposition can be detected, one should stop looking for arguments
why it is actually not there. But if it is there, the measurement problem does not
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arise, for no measurement has been performed in that case!
The same would-be difficulty arises in the modal interpretation (see below), and,
as pointed out by Dieks (1994a), in practically any measurement theory. His answer
is as satisfactory as the one given above; he simply points out that in the modal
interpretation the pointer possesses a (macroscopic) spin in the direction determined
by aU + ǫ(t)bD; this direction is practically indistinguishable from the z-axis, and
the problem has been obviated (the second point discussed by Dieks concerns the
situation where a ≃ b, but the difficulties this leads to are only relevant for small
pointers)24.
The argument above was given in the Schro¨dinger picture, where the states evolve
in time. This conceals a very important aspect of our scenario. In the single-photon
example, where the algebra of observables was taken to be D2 ⊂ M2, the time-
evolution of the state vectors Ψ ∈ C2 is simply given by a unitary one-parameter
group Ut in M2, i.e., Ψ(t) = UtΨ. This defines an automorphic time-evolution on
M2 by passing to the Heisenberg picture, in which A(t) = U
∗
t
AUt for each A ∈ M2.
However, this will generally map elements of D2 outside this algebra, unless each
Ut itself lies in D2. But if the initial state is c1e1 + c2e2, then such a time-evolution
would merely change the phases of the ci, and the whole show would have to be
canceled. However, the observed time-evolution Aobs(t) of an observable A ∈ D2
is obviously not A(t), but merely the part of this operator which lies in D2, that
is, its diagonal. Defining the projectors Pi = [ei] (i = 1, 2) we can write this as
Aobs(t) =
∑
i PiA(t)Pi.
The proper setting for this discussion is the algebra of observables A of the sys-
tem, the apparatus, and the environment together. In our context its superselection
structure only derives from the last component, but this particularity is irrelevant
for the following construction. Let H be the Hilbert space of state vectors of A; ac-
cording to our assumptions, this contains a number of superselection sectors Hi (for
simplicity we assume discrete superselection rules). We denote the projector onto
Hi by Pi. If Ut is the unitary one-parameter group defining time-evolution on H,
24Also cf. Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo (1994) for an extensive discussion of this controversial issue.
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then, as before, one has25 Aobs(t) =
∑
i PiU
∗
t
AUtPi. For Ut /∈ A this evolution is non-
automorphic and irreversible, and the origin of this irreversibility (namely projection
on the relevant degrees of freedom) is the same as in conscientious non-equilibrium
statistical mechanics, e.g. Balian et al. (1986).
Also, one is immediately reminded of the collapse of the wavefunction. For if ρ is
a density matrix then the expectation value TrρAobs(t) equals TrρcollapsedA(t), where
ρcollapsed =
∑
i PiρPi. But there are two important differences between the above
‘collapse’ of ρ to ρcollapsed, and the traditional (von Neumann) collapse. Firstly,
the former does not take place instantaneously; indeed, it has nothing to do with
perception and little with measurement. Rather, it is a consequence of the selection
of the algebra of observables. Secondly, the collapse does not take place with respect
to the spectral projections of the system observable that is measured, but with
respect to the projectors on the superselection sectors. Since in our approach the
latter are neither related to the system that is measured, nor to the measurement
apparatus, we see that the two collapses should not be confused indeed26.
A further point concerns the argument why the pointer should be in either the
state U or in D, given that the total system of pointer + environment has the
state vector aU ⊗ e1 + bD ⊗ e2. Zurek here mumbles something about “the right
of a macroscopic (but ultimately quantum) system to be in its own state” (Zurek,
1993, p. 287), and proceeds with the usual argument of reducing the density matrix
of the total system by tracing over the environment. This leaves the mixed state
|a|2[U ] + |b|2[D] of the pointer, which is then construed according to the ignorance
interpretation. The last step is justified by Zurek by the idea that the basis relative
to which this reduced state is decomposed is precisely the preferred pointer basis
(Zurek, 1981).
Although this reasoning leads to the correct result, it is based on a questionable
application of the ignorance interpretation (namely to mixtures whose extremal
25Technically, the map E(A) =
∑
i
PiAPi defines a conditional expectation E : B(H)→ A. See
Davies (1976) and Landsman (1991) for other uses of such maps in measurement theory.
26Though if one interprets A as the algebra of system observables then formally ρcollapsed is
what one obtains from Lu¨ders’ rule, applied to the measurement of central elements of A (whose
spectrum is highly degenerate if A is sufficiently non-commutative).
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decomposition is non-unique). Moreover, it obscures the origin of the ‘factualization’
of the states U andD, viz. the assumed superselection rule of the environment, which
itself is caused by the delocalization of the quantum coherence (which according to
the ‘kernel’ of the theory is always there) and the locality of the observer. Hence
in our opinion the correct argument is as follows. Without superselection, i.e.,
serious restrictions on what the observables of the theory are, there is no collapse of
the wavepacket. On the other hand, if the operators interpolating between highly
delocalized states of the environment are removed, the state [aU ⊗ e1 + bD ⊗ e2]
collapses to |a|2[U⊗e1]+ |b|
2[D⊗e2] in the case at hand. Thus one not only has the
collapse of a pure to a mixed state, but on top of that the mixed state has a unique
decomposition into the pure states U ⊗ e1 and D ⊗ e2. These are product states,
hence the only state of each subsystem consistent with each of these pure states on
the combined system is the one occurring as a factor in the tensor product.
However, this does not mean that the pointer observable S now has a value,
at least not in our interpretation. In the Introduction we mentioned that in our
interpretation an observable can only have a given value (in other words, possess a
property) if it is in the centre of the algebra of observables; in particular, we abandon
the usual stipulation that an arbitrary observable possesses a value (namely, the
pertinent eigenvalue) if the system is in an eigenstate of the corresponding operator.
Hence, if we take the (finite) pointer by itself, we are unable to conclude that the
macroscopic spin observable S has the value +1 even if all the spins in the pointer are
up. Indeed, since the algebra of observables of the finite pointer has no superselection
rules, none of its observables has a value in any state: a pure quantum system simply
has no properties in the usual sense.
Our illusion that the pointer is ‘up’ is entirely caused by its photon environ-
ment. It suffices to illustrate this matter in the model we used before, where
the environment consists of a single photon. The total algebra of observables was
Atot = M2N ⊗D2; its centre is simply I2N ⊗D2, where I2N is the identity operator
for the pointer. In particular, the photon operator I2N ⊗ σ3 is in this centre, and
in our interpretation we are allowed to conclude that it actually has the value +1
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in any state of the form Ψ ⊗ e1, where Ψ is an arbitrary pointer state. Given the
dynamics of the pointer-environment interaction, which brings the states ↑ . . . ↑
and e1 in correlation, we may then conclude that the pointer is in the state ↑ . . . ↑
if we observe the photon in the state e1, and, by implication, that the little parti-
cle whose spin was measured by the pointer, is in the state ‘spin up’ as well. Yet
none of the pointer observables possess values corresponding to this state, because
they do not possess any value at all. This is an entirely satisfactory conclusion, for
all we actually see is the photon environment. Of course, this conclusion is really
convincing only if the photon environment is huge; the qualitative argument is the
same also in that case. And when means of monitoring other than vision apply, an
analogous argument hawks about, the photon environment replaced by whatever is
being monitored by the observer.
Finally, note that the pointer itself does have properties if it is infinite, and its
algebra of observables has a nontrivial center. The point of the discussion in section
3 is that this property does not yet suffice to make it a measurement apparatus.
5 Some remarks on the modal interpretation
Many issues concerning environment and superselection are also relevant for the
modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. This programme is still under devel-
opment; there are four different versions, due to van Fraassen (1991), Kochen (1985),
Healey (1989), and Dieks (1994a)27. The essential business of the modal interpreta-
tion is to put a subtle form of the projection postulate neither in the mathematical
formalism, nor in Nature itself, but in the rules of interpretation of the formalism.
As such it is able to provide a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics (in the
sense of ‘A-realism’, cf. the Introduction) without changing its mathematical struc-
ture at all. Further using the terminology of the Introduction, the modal reading of
quantum mechanics puts the physical interpretation of the formalism into the ker-
nel, and aims at describing observations as special instances of properties of systems
27We have cited the most accessible and relevant publications. There are older papers by
van Fraassen and by Dieks on this subject, and the four authors have developed their ideas
independently.
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possessed anyway.
The modal interpretation maintains the rule that an observable of the total
system actually possesses a value if the total system is in an eigenstate of it. However,
the eigenvector-eigenvalue link is dropped as a bidirectional connection, in that
observables of subsystems may have values in states where the von Neumann liturgy
would deny that these values are possessed.
The starting point of the modal interpretation (at least in the version of Dieks
(1994a,b), on which we will concentrate) is an arbitrary28 decomposition of the world
S into (say) two parts S1, S2, so that (in obvious notation) H = H1 ⊗H2, and the
state of the whole system Ψ ∈ H has the Schmidt decomposition Ψ =
∑
N
i=1 ciϕi⊗χi.
We assume that all the ϕi and χi are normalized, so that
∑
i |ci|
2 = 1; N may be
infinite, and we take H separable. Let us now concentrate on the subsystem S1
taken by itself. Given Ψ, the Hilbert space of S1 decomposes as H1 = ⊕
N ′
i′=0H
(i′)
1 .
Here firstly H
(0)
1 is the subspace orthogonal to all ϕi, secondly H
(i′)
1 equals the one-
dimensional space spanned by ϕi whenever ci is nondegenerate, and finally all vectors
ϕi with identical coefficients ci together span a single summand H
(i′)
1 . Thus apart
from 0 the index i′ takes the same values as i, except that those values of i which
correspond to the same numerical value of ci are combined into a single i
′.
The crucial step in the modal interpretation is to specify which observables
in B(H1) possess values, given the total state Ψ. In a slight modification of the
literature29 we stipulate that each self-adjoint element of the von Neumann algebra
Ad of all operators which are diagonal w.r.t. the above decomposition possesses a
value. An operator A ∈ Ad necessarily has discrete spectrum, and has the form
A =
∑
i′ ai′P
(i′), where P (i
′) is the orthogonal projector onto H
(i′)
1 . When all ai′’s
are different30, the value ai′ is possessed with probability pi′ = dimH
(i′)
1 · |ci|
2, where
28For Healey (1989) there is a preferred decomposition corresponding to elementary particles.
29The choices in Dieks (1994a), Dieks (1994b), and Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo (1994) are all
different from each other, as well as from our prescription. Dieks (1994a) excludes any operator
acting nontrivially on H
(0)
1 . Dieks (1994b) includes all such operators as long as they act trivially
on the orthogonal complement of H
(0)
1 , and assigns the possessed value 0 with probability 1 to
them. The choice of Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo (1994) does not only depend on Ψ, but in addition
on the contingent value state.
30In which case A may still have degenerate spectrum, namely whenever the Schmidt decompo-
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i is related to i′ as explained in the previous paragraph. (We put p0 ≡ 0.) If there
are degeneracies among the ai′ one merely has to sum over the pi′ corresponding to
the degenerate subspaces. Note that
∑
i′ pi′ =
∑
i |ci|
2 = 1. A similar assignment of
properties holds for S2 taken by itself.
We have written the modal interpretation in the above form in order to stress the
analogy with the value attribution for systems with superselection rules discussed
in this paper. The point is that both Ad ⊂ B(H1) and Z(A) ⊂ A are commutative
subalgebras of the algebra of beables and of observables of the system in question,
respectively. It is clear that at any fixed time one may consistently assign properties
to all observables in such subalgebras. In the modal interpretation this subalgebra
depends on the choice of subsystem and on the state of the total system. In the
superselection approach it originates in the observer and the environment. (Note
that B(H1) and A have a rather different structure, e.g., the former does not have
a nontrivial centre.)
The modal interpretation is tailor-made to add the finishing touch to the envi-
ronmental approach in its original formulation (Zurek, 1982, Joos and Zeh, 1985),
that is, without superselection rules. For, as we mentioned earlier, the aim of this
approach is to interpret ‘pointer’ states of the form pn, which have the property that
they couple to the environment E according to pn ⊗ IE → pn ⊗ en for ‘arbitrary’
initial states IE of E, and (en, em) ≃ δnm, as classical states. The modal inter-
pretation provides exactly the missing link allowing such an interpretation, which
helpfully shows that even such an intuitively attractive solution to the measurement
problem as the environmental one, requires a double Dutch extra interpretative rule
of quantum mechanics.
The value attribution given by the modal interpretation is equivalent to the
ignorance interpretation of mixed states in the following sense. If the extremal de-
composition of the mixed state obtained by restricting Ψ to (say) S1 is nonunique
(which is the usual situation), the modal interpretation precisely leads to the correct
interpretation of the orthogonal decomposition (which most often is unique, and cor-
sition is degenerate.
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responds to the spectral decomposition of the reduced density operator). If, on the
other hand, one of the subsystems (say S2) possesses superselection rules, then after
a short time the ‘pointer basis’ of S1 is singled out by the Schmidt decomposition,
and the modal interpretation ascertains that S1 taken by itself is effectively in one
of the states31 pn, quite in accordance with our predilection.
However, this is precisely where we feel that the modal interpretation overshoots
its aim: for it applies whether or not S1 or S2 are macroscopic, possess superselection
rules, etc. For example, the moon may acquire properties (that it would not have
had otherwise) by becoming correlated with a mouse, and this seems almost as bad
to us as the moon only existing when the mouse looks at it (as in extreme versions
of the Copenhagen interpretation, ridiculed in this way by Einstein ). Thus to
our mind the modal interpretation has a similar flaw as B-realists’ approaches to
the measurement problem: it is made regardless of the situation at hand (system
small or large? observer present and/or relevant? what are the relevant degrees of
freedom?), and thus provides a universal rule in a problem where the particulars
seem to be of prime importance.
In addition, there are two (related) technical difficulties with the modal inter-
pretation, which are absent in our approach. The first problem is that of property
composition of subsystems32; it appeared in a seminar by R. Clifton and was fur-
ther analyzed by Bacciagaluppi (1994). The perplexity is that if S1 and S2 possess
property P1 and P2, respectively, one cannot conclude that the combined system
S1&S2 possesses the combined property P1&P2. This is even true if one of the Pi
is the trivial property always possessed (which is represented by the unit operator).
Hence an observable A may apply to S1 but S1 ⊗ I may then not apply to the total
system. Our approach does not have this problem, because the centre of an alge-
bra is naturally contained in the center of any tensor product in which the algebra
appears as a factor.
The second brain-twister concerns the combination of properties of a single sys-
31Here meant as a value state in the sense of van Fraassen (1991).
32Healey’s version of the modal interpretation is free of this difficulty, at some other expenses,
cf. Bacciagaluppi (1994).
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tem at different times33. It amounts to the fact that if the system has properties
Pi at various times ti, then the combination ‘P1 at t1 and P2 at t2 and. . . cannot re-
ally be regarded as a property, because the different (contingent) properties of that
nature do not combine well under the usual rules of probability theory. In other
words, the properties assigned by the modal interpretation at different times do not
necessarily form a consistent history in the sense of Omne`s (1992), Gell-Mann and
Hartle (1990, 1993).
Our proposed value attribution does not suffer from this blemish, for the projec-
tion operators defining properties are central. Therefore, any history composed out
of them automatically satisfies the so-called consistency conditions, which guarantee
that the joint probability distribution of the multi-time properties behaves correctly
under taking marginals. Conversely, this could be taken as an argument in favour of
our value attribution prescription, which only assigns properties to classical observ-
ables. The price we pay is that (as we have seen) the time-evolution on the algebra
of observables A is generally non-automorphic, so that the centre is not necessarily
stable under time-evolution. Hence a given observable may be classical at one time,
but not at another.
Fortunately, the modal interpretation and the superselection approach (both
crucially amended by environmental ideas; for the former this is explained in Dieks
(1994a), for the latter we refer to the present paper) completely agree when applied
to everyday situations. And it is precisely the explanation of common or garden life
by quantum mechanics that causes B-realists such night thoughts. . . The essential
point of coincidence between the two is that a subsystem may have properties that
the total system does not have: objectification is achieved by ignorance. The igno-
rance in the former relates to the step of taking a subsystem by itself in order to
assign properties to it, whereas in the latter the blindness is to the correlations in
the discarded part of the world.
33This is being studied by (at least) D. Albert, D. Dieks, A. Kent, and P. Vermaas. We learnt
of the difficulty from Kent.
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6 Discussion
The bravura language used in this paper is not meant to conceal the fact that
only the barest outline of a resolution (or, better, dissolution) of the measurement
problem along the lines sketched has been given. More detail was not omitted
for reasons of space or appropriateness to the journal, but because what has been
written is all there is. What more is to be done?
Philosophically, the possibility that the abeyance of a certain class of observables
is the origin of stochasticity in quantum mechanics deserves to be investigated. We
stress that such an account should not be confused with the kind of ignorance about
the state of some discarded subsystem (or environment) that is usually invoked.
Both types of ignorance are codified by restricting a state on some algebra to a
subalgebra; when the latter is a simple factor in a tensor product this amounts to
partial tracing, and leads to the usual sort of nescience. In our proposal, on the
other hand, one restricts to an algebra with a centre, which restriction cannot be
described by partial tracing, for the original algebra is not the tensor product of the
reduced one with some other algebra.
In this light, arguments in favour of the ignorance interpretation of mixed states
(that is, only those whose extremal decomposition is unique, of course) would be
welcome; such an interpretation is necessary to comply with the empirical predictions
of quantum mechanics, but is not at all obvious (cf. van Fraassen (1991, sect. 7.3)).
Similarly, it would be welcome to have an interpretation of the notion of a state
which goes beyond the minimal definition as a rule to compute expectation values
of observables. This definition begs the question of how such expectation values are
to be interpreted, and is only unambiguous for the restriction of a state to the centre
of an algebra of observables with superselection rules. For in that case, a state is
simply a value attribution rule in the sense of classical physics. In the opposite case
of a system without superselection sectors, we have seen that no value attribution
takes place of any observable, and we should apparently look in the (unsatisfactory)
direction of regarding states as preparation procedures.
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In this context it is remarkable that the ↑ . . . ↑ state of the pointer (taken by
itself) does not ascribe the value +1 to the observable S, although it has this very
expectation value with mathematical variance (spread) 0. This should not make
us feel too uncomfortable, for one always implicitly has to add the clause “if it
were observed”, which for us means that it is brought into a suitable correlation
with a system (i.e., the environment) having ‘beables’ that are not observed, and
accordingly accommodates classical (i.e., central) observables. We have seen that if
such a correlation is indeed established, it is the observation of the correlated state
of the environment (rather than the pointer state itself) that leads to conclusions
about the value of S. If, on the other hand, no such correlation is established, the
statement that S has the sharp expectation value +1 should be read as part of the
mathematical specification of the state, rather than as a value attribution. For the
latter would only be defined counterfactually, and we know from the EPR discussion
how dangerous it is to confuse counterfactual conditionals with actual measurements
in quantum mechanics34.
On the technical side, the models in the literature (see Joos and Zeh (1985),
Zurek (1993) and refs. therein; also cf. the discussion with refs. in Busch et al.
(1991)) describing how system-environment interaction leads to decoherence, should
be extended so as to deal with very large systems (so far, only the environment E
has been treated as macroscopic). In that way, the robustness of Zurek’s stability
condition can be examined. Also, stochastic Schro¨dinger equations for the pointer
state should be derived from its coupling to E, and solved; much of the necessary
mathematical technology is under active development, inspired by rather different
philosophies, but leading to similar mathematical structures, cf. the contributions
of A. Amann, P. Blanchard and A. Jadczyk, P. Bona, N. Gisin, and H. Primas35 to
Busch et al. (1994), as well as Blanchard and Jadczyk (1993) and Jadczyk (1994a,b),
34Cf. Healey (1989) for arguments not to assign a value to certain observables which are
dispersion-free in a given state.
35In the approach of Primas the entire environment is taken to be classical, i.e., its algebra of
observables is commutative. This exorbitant truncation of its beables is well-motivated by a deep
result (Raggio’s theorem) to the effect that only in that case the quantum system coupled to the
environment is free of EPR-correlations with it, and admits a so-called individual description. For
our purposes the mere presence of a central subalgebra suffices.
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for an up-to-date survey, and the seminal paper Gisin (1984) for older work36. A
theory of human consciousness would be helpful, too.
To close the paper, we will now recapitulate by answering some rational ob-
jections to the superselection programme we found in the literature. They come
from van Fraassen’s book (van Fraassen, 1991), and are attributed to Beltrametti-
Cassinelli, Hughes, Leggett, and van Fraassen himself, respectively (in Busch et al.
(1991) the second one is ascribed to Piron).
1. Question: what accounts for the superselection rule?
Answer: Ultimately, the locality of the observer. Under appropriate circum-
stances the coherence of the coupled system is delocalized, hence ever-present
from an absolute point of view, but lost to the observer. This phenomenon
causes most instances of ‘objectification’ in quantum mechanics.
2. Question: the fact that the system carrying the superselection rules is able
to evolve in finite time from a given initial state into various different sectors
(depending on the state of the system it is coupled to), implies that its Hamil-
tonian is not an observable. How about that? After all, the identification
of the Hamiltonian with the observable Energy is one of the cornerstones of
quantum mechanics.
Answer: We have seen that in Hepp’s approach this objection is met by taking
the t→∞ limit (at least when the time-evolution is automorphic). This limit
also played a role in the environmental appraoch, in that the inner product
(en(t), em(t)) ≃ δnm only for t→∞ and an infinite environment (cf. section 4).
As we have seen, the former limit was fatal, but the latter harmless. But that
does not answer the question, for even if the inner product above is nonzero
for finite times, the initial environment state must still evolve nontrivially
‘through’ the sectors, and that is not possible either, if the Hamiltonian is a
function of the observables (cf. the discussion in section 4). The answer to
36 It is to be expected that such stochastic equations, derived from the unitary time-evolution
of the whole system, reproduce the main features of the so-called GRW theory (Ghirardi et al.,
1986), cf. Jadczyk (1994b). Thus it is curious that the spontaneous localization model of GRW is
often interpreted as a fundamental modification of quantum mechanics.
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the question is that the evolution driving the environment through its various
superselection sectors is not Hamiltonian; more importantly, this evolution is
generated by operators which do not belong to the algebra of observables. This
is possible and consistent because of the special way the superselection rules of
the environment arise in our approach. Namely, we start with a simple algebra
of ‘beables’ of the environment; the Hamiltonian is in (or, technically, is affil-
iated to) this algebra. Then we truncate this algebra of beables to a smaller,
effective algebra of observables having a nontrivial centre. The Hamiltonian
is not in this smaller algebra, but it still drives the time-evolution of its state
space. In other words, the reason that the Hamiltonian is not an observable is
that we have willy-nilly restricted the set of operators to define the algebra of
observables, but the discarded operators still contribute to the Hamiltonian.
3. Question: Do superselection rules add empirical content?
Answer: yes, in the following sense: the inspection of a certain apparatus or the
study of some environment coupling to a given system may reveal that certain
operators are not monitored, and that a ‘pointer basis’ of the system is singled
out. In case that this leads to superselection rules, the theory will predict that
certain superpositions do not exist as pure states. See Amann (1991) for the
case of chiral molecules, and Wan and Harrison (1993) for Josephson junctions
in SQUID rings. Thus far, such ‘predictions’ have not quite run ahead of
observations, but as theoretical explanations they are nontrivial. Moreover,
certain superselection rules exist in their own right (e.g., parity), in the sense
that they are not caused by the limited resources available to physicists and
other IGUS’s. Perhaps new such rules may be empirically discovered.
4. Question: Is it claimed that quantum mechanics without superselection rules
makes no predictions for what happens in micro processes in the iono-sphere?
Answer: Relative to the algebra of all beables in the world, quantum mechanics
indeed fails to predict any concrete event or outcome. Without superselection,
nothing ‘happens’ up there in the iono-sphere. But there is still the state of
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the total system and its restriction to the algebra of beables of the iono-sphere;
this restriction is generically mixed, and its time-evolution is duly given by the
theory. However, one does not need a balloon with an observer in it in order to
make predictions of events defined relative to any such observer; their algebras
of observables will all be compatible with locality, and practically all events
in the iono-sphere, with their associated probabilities, will be meaningfully
defined for all such local algebras of observables simultaneously. But, once
again, these events are not there intrinsically.
We hope that the reader is satisfied with these answers. If so, we trust that (s)he
agrees with the author, that the real problem in the interpretation of quantum
mechanics is not the explanation of classical ‘reality’ in a quantum world (for the
interpretation of objective classical phenomena is rather clear), but the clarification
of the physical meaning of the ‘kernel’ of quantum mechanics in situations where no
‘objectification’ in the usual sense takes place. Thus we feel that the Copenhagen
interpretation is too limited in its claim that the entire physical meaning of quantum
mechanics must be expressed in terms of the properties of classical physics37; the
physical interpretation of non-central operators is as yet merely unknown - not
meaningless in principle.
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